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PREEMPTING HUMANITY:  WHY NATIONAL MEAT 
ASS’N V. HARRIS ANSWERED THE WRONG 
QUESTION 
Pamela Vesilind* 
INTRODUCTION 
The 2011-12 Supreme Court term was notable for high-profile cases about 
state undocumented immigrant law,1 GPS-enabled police searches,2 chronic liars 
claiming military honors,3 and the constitutionality of the Affordable Health Care 
Act.4  As such, it is unsurprising that the decision in National Meat Ass’n v. 
Harris,5 notable for its unanimity and matter-of-fact concision, received relatively 
little attention from the media or the academy.6  Nevertheless, National Meat is a 
bellwether federalism opinion, the significance of which has been widely 
overlooked.   
At first blush, the legal question in National Meat appeared to be relatively 
unremarkable:  whether the USDA’s slaughterhouse and packing plant regulations 
under the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA, or “Meat Inspection Act”)7 
preempted new California standards for handling disabled livestock—standards 
higher than those required by the USDA.8  A logical extrapolation of the Court’s 
reasoning for striking down California’s regulations suggests an alarmingly 
remarkable and novel premise:  that the federal government has absolute 
supremacy in regulating welfare standards for animals in agriculture.  This 
unfortunate consequence might have been avoided, had National Meat not asked 
the wrong question.  
The challenged state regulations were amendments to California’s criminal 
animal cruelty law, enacted after The Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) 
published video taken during an undercover investigation at a Hallmark/Westland 
Meat Packing Company plant in Chino, California.  The video documented 
multiple incidents of former dairy cows, too sick or injured to stand or walk to the 
slaughter chute, being shocked with electric prods, shoved along the ground with 
                                                                                                     
 * J.D., LL.M., Adjunct Professor, Univ. of Arkansas School of Law and Vermont Law School.  I 
would like to thank Managing Editor Benjamin Birney and his team at the Maine Law Review for their 
indispensable editorial assistance.  I would also like to thank Symposium Editor Charles Boyle and the 
2013 Food Law Colloquium team for coordinating an exceptional event.  All mistakes and errors, of 
course, are my own. 
 1. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
 2. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 3. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). 
 4. Nat’l Fed’n of Ind. Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) [hereinafter NFIB]. 
 5. Nat’l Meat Ass’n v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 965 (2012).   
 6. Cf. David N. Cassuto, Meat Animals, Humane Standards & Other Legal Fictions, L., CULTURE 
& HUMAN., at 2 (July 17, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2111455 (analyzing Justice 
Kagan’s rhetoric). 
 7. 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-95 (West 1999 & Supp. 2012). 
 8. Cal. Pen. Code § 599f was introduced in February 2008 and signed by the Governor of 
California on July 22, 2008.  2008 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 194 (A.B. 2098) (West). 
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forklift prongs, or dragged behind a tractor.9  Reacting to this widely-viewed video, 
the USDA temporarily closed the plant for investigations and urged Hallmark to 
initiate the largest meat recall in U.S. history.10  The California legislature acted to 
address food safety concerns, prohibiting California-based slaughterhouses and 
related business partners from dealing in non-ambulatory animals11 and banning the 
use of non-ambulatory animals for human food.12  This Essay focuses on the other 
provisions of § 599f, the subsections drafted to regulate how the animals were 
treated while they were still alive.13   
Ten days before these measures became effective, the National Meat 
Association (NMA), a trade organization representing the cattle and hog industries, 
sought injunctive and declaratory relief in federal court.14  NMA won in district 
court15 but lost on appeal in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.16  In November 
2011, the Supreme Court took up the question of whether the Federal Meat 
Inspection Act’s preemption language applied, expressly or impliedly, to invalidate 
the California regulations.  The Court’s unanimous answer:  Yes; the FMIA 
preemption clause invalidated all aspects of the new state regulations because they 
created “addition[al]” obligations in slaughterhouse “operations.”17  Further, these 
operations were solely defined under the FMIA, in service of its “dual goals of safe 
                                                                                                     
 9. Nancy Perry & Peter Brandt, A Case Study on Cruelty to Farm Animals:  Lessons Learned from 
the Hallmark Meat Packing Case, 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 117, 119 (2008), 
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/106/perrybrandt.pdf. . 
 10. USDA FOOD SAFETY & INSPECTION SERV., Recall Release No. FSIS-RC-005-2008, California 
Firm Recalls Beef Products Derived from Non-Ambulatory Cattle Without the Benefit of Proper 
Inspection (Feb. 17, 2008), http://www.fsis.usda.gov/pdf/recall_005-2008_release.pdf.  
 11. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 599f(a), (f)-(g) (West, Westlaw current with all 2012 Reg. Sess. laws, 
Gov.Reorg.Plan No. 2 of 2011-2012, and all propositions on 2012 ballots). 
 12. Id. § 599f(b). 
 13. These sections read: 
(c)  No slaughterhouse shall hold a nonambulatory animal without taking immediate action to 
humanely euthanize the animal. 
(d)  No stockyard, auction, market agency, or dealer shall hold a nonambulatory animal without 
taking immediate action to humanely euthanize the animal or to provide immediate veterinary 
treatment. 
(e)  While in transit or on the premises of a stockyard, auction, market agency, dealer, or 
slaughterhouse, a nonambulatory animal may not be dragged at any time, or pushed with 
equipment at any time, but shall be moved with a sling or on a stoneboat or other sled-like or 
wheeled conveyance. 
Id. §§ 599f(c)-(e). 
 14. Nat’l Meat Ass’n v. Brown, 2009 WL 426213, at *1 (E.D. Cal., Feb. 19, 2009) (No. CV-F-08-
1963 LJO DLB).  Whereas the Hallmark video depicted the abuses of non-ambulatory cattle, National 
Meat Association sued on behalf of the swine industry, a clever choice that deflected attention from the 
images of abused cattle.  Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief Against All Defendants by 
National Meat Ass’n., Nat’l Meat Ass’n v. Brown, No. CV-F-08-1963 LJO DLB (E.D. Cal., Dec. 23, 
2008).   
 15. Nat’l Meat, 2009 WL 426213, at *10. 
 16. Nat’l Meat Ass’n v. Brown, 599 F.3d 1093, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 2010); vacated sub nom. Nat’l 
Meat Ass'n v. Harris, 680 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 17. 21 U.S.C.A. § 678 (West 1999 & Supp. 2012) (preempting state regulations “in addition to” or 
“different than” USDA regulations regarding slaughterhouse “premises, facilities, and operations”); 
Nat’l Meat Ass’n v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 965, 970 (2012). 
688 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:2 
meat and humane slaughter.”18   
This Essay argues that California missed an opportunity to preserve the 
subsections of § 599f that raised its humane care guidelines for disabled livestock.  
Rather than seeking a restrained reading of the FMIA’s preemption language, 
California should have challenged Congress’s Commerce Clause authority to 
establish upper limits on farmed animal welfare regulations, to the de facto 
preemption of more protective state regulations.19  The proper inquiry was whether 
§§ 599f(c)-(e) unreasonably frustrated interstate commerce under the “dormant” 
Commerce Clause doctrine.20  Under this doctrine, USDA regulations promulgated 
under the FMIA and the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act (HMSA or “Humane 
Slaughter Act”) might not invalidate reasonable state protections for farmed 
animals.   
To clarify, this Essay does not challenge Congress’s authority to set minimum 
standards for humane treatment of livestock at slaughterhouse facilities.  Without 
these minimum standards, slaughter plants would have less incentive to take the 
precautions Congress has deemed necessary for minimizing risks of meat 
contamination and line worker injury, and for preventing a state-based race to the 
deregulation basement.  Nor does this Essay promote a case-by-case, as-applied 
analysis of when FMIA guidelines regulating humane slaughter and the 
management of livestock in connection with slaughter should preempt state or local 
regulation.  That approach, which the Supreme Court has rejected in recent 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, would require courts to “excise individual 
applications of a concededly valid statutory scheme.”21  Finally, this Essay does not 
ask whether the federal government should legislate in the field of animal cruelty, 
only whether it is constitutionally authorized to expressly preempt similar state 
efforts to raise ethical standards for the care of farmed animals.  It is a question 
worth asking, considering the current flux of Commerce Clause and preemption 
jurisprudence22 and the documented frequency of farmed animal abuse.23   
Part I of this Essay explains how the Humane Slaughter Act’s standards for 
humane livestock slaughter and the handling of non-ambulatory livestock came to 
be referenced by the Meat Inspection Act, and how the Supreme Court interpreted 
these guidelines in National Meat Ass’n v. Harris.  Part II discusses how legislative 
authority for animal welfare is typically allocated between state and federal 
governments.  Congress’s Commerce Clause power to impose upper limits on 
                                                                                                     
 18. Nat’l Meat Ass’n, 132 S. Ct. at 967.   
 19. The state might have stipulated to the preemption of §§ 599f(a)-(b), (f)-(g), sections that spoke 
directly to the handling of animals for food safety concerns.  Nat’l Meat Ass’n, 132 S. Ct. at 970. 
 20. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (“Where the statute regulates even-
handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only 
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation 
to the putative local benefits.”). 
 21. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 23 (2005) (“Where the class of activities is regulated and that 
class is within the reach of federal power, the courts have no power ‘to excise, as trivial, individual 
instances’ of the class.” (quoting Perez v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 154 (1992) (emphasis omitted)). 
 22. Pamela Vesilind, Emerging Constitutional Threats to Food Labeling Reform, 17 NEXUS: CHAP. 
J. L. & POL’Y 59, 68-73 (2012).  
 23. Cheryl L. Leahy, Large-Scale Farmed Animal Abuse & Neglect:  Law & Its Enforcement, 4 J. 
ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 63, 64-69 (May 2011). 
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animal welfare standards for slaughter conditions and the treatment of non-
ambulatory livestock is examined in Part III.  The Essay concludes that National 
Meat Ass’n v. Harris asked and answered the wrong question.  Rather than 
analyzing the FMIA’s preemption language, the Court should have scrutinized 
California’s livestock welfare regulations for their effects on interstate commerce.24   
I.  BACKGROUND:  FEDERAL MEAT INSPECTION, SLAUGHTER STANDARDS,  
AND NATIONAL MEAT ASS’N V. HARRIS 
Although the preemption language at issue in National Meat is part of the 
Meat Inspection Act, the USDA regulations regarding livestock management at 
slaughter are promulgated under another federal law, the Humane Slaughter Act.25  
Justice Kagan’s recitation of applicable law in the National Meat opinion implies 
that the two statutes are essentially merged.  This is an over-simplification, 
contradicted by the two statutes’ markedly different legislative histories.    
The FMIA is a broad food safety statute conceived in 1906, in the wake of 
Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle.  The Meat Inspection Act’s purpose is to reassure 
consumers that their meat and meat products will be “wholesome, not adulterated, 
and properly marked, labeled, and packaged.”26  It further seeks to protect the 
marketplace, especially producers and processors that comply with the standards.27  
Under this broad directive, the USDA is charged with regulating most aspects of 
meat production and distribution in commerce.  Prohibited acts include 
“misbranding” or “adulterating” meat that is “capable of use as human food,” and 
engaging in commercial transactions of such misbranded or adulterated products.28  
On the other hand, the Humane Slaughter Act is fundamentally an animal 
welfare law.29  Enacted in 1958 after three years of heated congressional debate,30 
its mandate is straightforward:  that livestock slaughter, “and the handling of 
livestock in connection with slaughter[,] . . . be carried out only by humane 
methods.”31  Livestock covered under the act32 must be unconscious “before being 
shackled, hoisted, thrown, cast, or cut.”33  During its first two decades, the HMSA 
contained no enforcement provisions, and it applied only to slaughterhouses 
                                                                                                     
 24. See generally Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (balancing “the nature of the 
local interest involved” with the state law’s “impact on interstate activities”).  The scope of this Essay 
does not permit a thorough analysis under the “dormant” Commerce Clause doctrine.   
 25.  7 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1907 (2006). 
 26. 21 U.S.C.A. § 602 (West 199 & Supp. 2012). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. § 610. 
 29. Jeff Welty, Humane Slaughter Laws, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 175, 184-88 (Winter, 2007). 
 30. Act of August 27, 1958, 72 Stat. 862, (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1906 (2006).   
 31. 7 U.S.C. § 1901. 
 32. Id. § 1902(a) (limiting coverage to “cattle, calves, horses, mules, sheep, swine, and other 
livestock”).  The USDA does not extend HMSA protection to poultry, which represent about 95% of the 
animals slaughtered annually in federally-inspected slaughterhouses.  Id. § 1902(a); Treatment of Live 
Poultry Before Slaughter, 70 Fed.Reg. 56,624, 56,624 (Sept. 28, 2005).   
 33. 7 U.S.C. § 1902(a) (defining “humane” to mean that the animal be “rendered insensible to pain 
by a single blow or gunshot or an electrical, chemical or other means that is rapid and effective”).   The 
law also has an expansive exemption for “slaughtering in accordance with the ritual requirements of the 
Jewish faith or any other religious faith.”  Id. § 1902(b).  
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wishing to sell to the federal government.   
In 1978, the FMIA was amended to require that all federally-inspected 
slaughterhouses comply with HMSA guidelines.34  By this time, FMIA standards 
also applied to meat processing plants engaged in intrastate-only commerce,35  
giving the USDA’s Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS) broad inspection scope.  
In applying FMIA enforcement mechanisms to the humane slaughter guidelines, 
the amendment imposed on FSIS inspectors the additional duty of monitoring 
compliance with humane slaughter guidelines. 
The HMSA regulations relevant to National Meat are those that address “non-
ambulatory” livestock.36  These animals, colloquially dubbed “downers,” have 
passed FSIS’s visual inspection upon their arrival at the slaughter facility, but for 
one reason or another, they have become lame or unable to walk down the narrow 
chute to the slaughter box.  Usually, this is due to exhaustion, or a fractured or 
broken leg.  This is not an uncommon occurrence in a system optimized for meat 
production, not animal health.  The cows in the Hallmark/Westland video, spent 
dairy cows already in poor condition, were particularly susceptible to becoming 
non-ambulatory.  
The inability to walk or stand may also be the effect of neurological disorder 
such as Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE or “mad cow disease”).37  
Therefore, the USDA requires that these animals be removed from the slaughter 
queue and sequestered until they can be viewed, ante-mortem, by the FSIS 
veterinary inspector.38  This inspector has the sole authority to determine whether 
the animal should be kept out of the human food supply.  If the inspector believes 
the lameness was caused by injury or exhaustion, they label the animal “suspect,” 
send him or her to slaughter, and later visually inspect the carcass for signs of a 
                                                                                                     
 34. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1907; 21 U.S.C.A. § 620(a) (West 1999 & Supp. 2012) (prohibiting the 
importation of meat or meat products derived from livestock not slaughtered or handled in accordance 
with the HMSA); id. § 603 (“examination of animals prior to slaughter; use of human methods”); id. § 
610 (“Prohibited acts include methods of slaughter or handling not in accordance with the HMSA . . . .”). 
 35. Id. § 661(a)(1).  The law gives states the option to implement their own inspection programs, so 
long as they are “at least equal” to federal inspection standards.  Id.   
 36. USDA regulations define non-ambulatory (or disabled) livestock as “livestock that cannot rise 
from a recumbent position or that cannot walk, including, but not limited to, those with broken 
appendages, severed tendons or ligaments, nerve paralysis, fractured vertebral column, or metabolic 
condition.”  9 C.F.R. § 309.2(b) (2012). 
 37. In 2003, a downed cow was identified as the first U.S. case of mad cow disease, renewing 
concerns about the safety of our meat supply.  See GEOFFREY S. BECKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
EBGR64,“MAD COW” DISEASE (BSE) 1 (2004), available at 
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/IB0082.pdf.  Four cases of BSE have 
been identified in the United States, most recently in April 2012.  Press Release, USDA, Statement, 
Release No. 0132.12, Statement by USDA Chief Veterinary Officer John Clifford Regarding a Detection 
of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in the United States, (Apr. 24, 2012) available at 
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?contentid=2012/04/0132.xml&contentidonly=true.  By 
2008, “at least 13 of the 16 identified BSE cases in North America” were discovered in non-ambulatory 
cattle.  Downers, Human Health Hazards, & USDA Policy, HUMANE SOC’Y U.S., (Apr. 30, 2008), 
http://www.humanesociety.org/assets/pdfs/farm/downers-health-concerns-usda-policy-4-23-08.pdf. 
 38. Non-Ambulatory Disabled Veal Calves and Other Non-Ambulatory Disabled Livestock, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 6572, 6573 (Feb. 7, 2011) (noting that the “case-by-case disposition determination for cattle that 
became non-ambulatory disabled after passing anti-mortem inspection . . . may have created an 
incentive for establishments to inhumanely force non-ambulatory disabled cattle to rise”). 
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pathogenic illness.39   
The requirement to sequester and locate an FSIS inspector for additional 
inspection makes downer livestock tremendously inconvenient and potentially 
expensive to meat processing companies like Hallmark/Westland.  It also 
incentivizes workers to “go to extraordinary lengths (often with the complicity and 
encouragement of management) to get the animals on to their feet and staggering 
toward the killing floor.”40  The 2008 Hallmark/Westland video revealed that the 
company had been disregarding federal requirements to submit non-ambulatory 
livestock to ante-mortem screenings.  This discovery was particularly disturbing 
because Westland Meat Company was the second largest beef supplier for 
government programs supporting senior citizens, needy families, and the National 
School Lunch Program.41   
Although some of the practices used on the downer cattle at 
Hallmark/Westland were illegal under USDA HMSA guidelines, others were not.  
California’s § 599f(c)-(e) attempted to correct this by raising the federal standards 
for managing lame or sick animals.42  For example, federal regulations allow 
disabled livestock to be subjected to electric prodding,43 and they may be pulled or 
dragged on the ground with “forklift or bobcat-type vehicles” so long as they have 
been “stunned.”44  By contrast, California’s regulations prohibited electric prodding 
as well as all methods for dragging or pushing non-ambulatory animals.45  The only 
allowable means for transporting disabled livestock were those employing “sled-
like or wheeled conveyance[s].”46  Moreover, rather than sequestering the animal 
for eventual visual assessment by an FSIS inspector, § 599f required slaughter 
plants to “tak[e] immediate action to humanely euthanize” or furnish the animal 
“immediate veterinary care.”47   
Because these state animal welfare standards required more of slaughterhouse 
operators than federal standards required, NMA argued that the state standards 
were preempted by the FMIA.  FMIA preempts all state regulations “with respect 
to premises, facilities and operations” subject to FSIS inspection48 if they are “in 
addition to, or different than” FMIA requirements.  For NMA’s challenge to 
prevail, this preemption authority must include the power to limit a state’s ability to 
regulate how its citizens treat agricultural animals.  Restated, the federal 
                                                                                                     
 39. 9 C.F.R. § 310 (2012).  Animals exhibiting difficulty in standing or walking are considered 
“high risk” in that they could be suffering from a central nervous system disorder associated with BSE.  
USDA, AUDIT REPORT:  ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSP. SERV. & FOOD SAFETY INSP. SERV. 
BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM—PHASE I, at i (Aug. 18, 
2004), available at http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-9-final.pdf. 
 40. Cassuto, supra note 6, at 2; Perry & Brandt, supra note 9, at 119. 
 41. Perry & Brandt, supra note 9, at 119.  
 42. Nat’l Meat Ass'n v. Brown, 599 F.3d 1093, 1101 (9th Cir. 2010), rev'd sub nom. Nat’l Meat 
Ass'n v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 965 (2012). 
 43. FOOD SAFETY & INSPECTION SERV., HUMANE HANDLING OF DEAD LIVESTOCK, FSIS 
DIRECTIVE 6900.1(V)(E) (1992). 
 44. 9 C.F.R. § 313.2(d)(2) (2012). 
 45. CAL. PENAL CODE § 599f(e) (Westlaw current with all 2012 Reg.Sess. laws, Gov.Reorg.Plan 
No. 2 of 2011-2012, and all propositions on 2012 ballots.). 
 46. Id. 
 47. CAL. PENAL CODE § 599f(d). 
 48. 21 U.S.C. § 678 (2006). 
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government’s message to state legislatures would be:  “Your citizens must treat 
injured or sick livestock animals this humanely, but you may not require them to 
behave more humanely.”   
National Meat was a case of first impression for challenging the federal 
humane slaughter provisions vis-à-vis more expansive state provisions.  Indeed, 
until National Meat, no federal animal welfare law had been infused with the 
power to set the upper limit for animal welfare standards, irrespective of a state’s 
purpose for enacting even modestly more restrictive guidelines.  As discussed in 
the next section, this concept is at odds with federalism principles that have 
historically recognized state authority to establish morality-based laws like animal 
cruelty statutes. 
II.  THE TRADITIONAL FEDERALIST DIVISION OF ANIMAL WELFARE LAW  
Animal welfare laws, or laws that regulate human interactions with non-human 
animals, reflect our values and interests.  Although most animals are still legally 
regarded as the personal property of their human owners,49 the scope and force of 
animal welfare law has evolved considerably in the last decade.50  Nearly all animal 
welfare law originates at the state level.  The relatively few federal civil and 
criminal laws are, more often than not, expressions of federal authority to regulate 
interstate commerce.51  Significantly, federal regulations that overlap with state 
police powers often set minimum standards to which state and local regulations 
may append.52  As discussed below, federal lawmakers have traditionally refrained 
from dictating standards for handling farmed animals, leaving states to legislate in 
this area.   
A.  Domesticated Animals 
With the exception of animals listed under the federal Endangered Species 
                                                                                                     
 49. Elizabeth L. DeCoux, Pretenders to the Throne:  A First Amendment Analysis of the Property 
Status of Animals, 18 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 185, 188-90 (2007). 
 50. Elizabeth Ann Overcash, Unwarranted Discrepancies in the Advancement of Animal Law: The 
Growing Disparity in Protection Between Companion Animals & Agricultural Animals, 90 N.C. L. REV. 
837, 850-51, 853 (March, 2012); 2012 U.S. Animal Protections Laws Rankings, ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. 
FUND 4 (Dec. 2012), http://aldf.org/custom/rankings/ALDF2012USRankingsReport.pdf [hereinafter 
ALDF Rankings] (observing that “over the past five years, more than three quarters of all states and 
territories experienced a significant improvement in their animal protection laws”). 
 51. See, i.e., Gavin R. Villareal, One Leg to Stand On:  The Treaty Power & Congressional 
Authority for the Endangered Species Act After United States v. Lopez, 76 TEXAS L. REV. 1125, 1134 
(Apr. 1998) (discussing expansive interpretations of Commerce Clause authority to affirm the 
constitutionality of various federal wildlife conservation statutes); Haviland v. Butz, 543 F.2d 169, 175 
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (affirming defendant’s conviction under the Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2136 
(1970), as a constitutional exercise of commerce power); c.f. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 
(1976) (affirming the constitutionality of the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act, 16 U.S.C. § 
1331 (1976), under the Property Clause); State of Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920) 
(recognizing Congress’s treaty power to enact the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, today codified at 16 
U.S.C. §§ 703-711). 
 52. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941) (“It is no objection to the assertion of the 
power to regulate interstate commerce that its exercise is attended by the same incidents which attend 
the exercise of the police power of the states.”). 
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Act, domesticated animals—our pets—are the animals most protected from harm 
by humans.  At a minimum, state animal cruelty statutes prohibit the intentional or 
malicious infliction of “unnecessary” physical pain or suffering.53  All states except 
North Dakota and South Dakota have felony animal cruelty provisions,54 and most 
states set minimum standards of care for animals in human possession, beginning 
with a basic duty to furnish food, water, medical care, and exercise.55   
Beyond these baselines, state and local animal welfare laws vary considerably, 
by the requisite actus reus or mens rea, or by degree of penalty.  A state may 
criminalize emotional torture, or physical injury due to recklessness or 
negligence.56  Although every state bans animal fighting, the penalty for attending 
or participating in these events often reflects regional culture.57  Finally, some 
states, including California, include some protections for wildlife and agricultural 
animals in their animal cruelty laws.58 
There is no uniform code to which state animal cruelty laws adhere.  In 2010’s 
United States v. Stevens, the Supreme Court noted this lack of uniformity as a 
central consideration in finding that a federal “crush video law” was overbroad.59  
Interpreting the federal ban as written, the Court envisioned scenarios wherein a 
video of someone hunting deer in the District of Columbia, where hunting is 
illegal, could be considered contraband in Virginia, where hunting is legal.60   
B.  Wildlife Animals 
When it comes to wildlife preservation, state legislation and federal legislation 
operate in tandem.  Except on federal lands, state agencies manage wildlife animals 
as natural resources,61 regulating human interactions with these animals.  A state’s 
general animal cruelty act may also apply to wildlife animals, but only for activities 
outside the fish and wildlife agency’s regulatory scope.  To illustrate, someone with 
a valid state hunting license may shoot deer during hunting season.  He may not, 
however, intentionally run over the deer with his snowmobile, because this 
behavior is well outside the scope of traditional hunting practices.  In this case, he 
                                                                                                     
 53. Joyce Tischler, A Brief History of Animal Law, Part II (1985-2011), 5 STAN. J. ANIMAL L. & 
POL’Y 27, 57-59 (2012) (tracking the development of modern animal cruelty law).   
 54. ALDF Rankings, supra note 50, at 3.   
 55. Animal Neglect Facts, ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND, http://aldf.org/article.php?id=1299 (last 
visited Feb. 14, 2013). 
 56. State Animal Cruelty Chart, HUMANE SOC’Y U.S. (June 1, 2012), 
http://www.humanesociety.org/assets/pdfs/abuse/state_animal_cruelty_laws_13.pdf.  
 57. Ranking of State Dogfighting Laws HUMANE SOC’Y U.S. (Jan. 2013), 
http://www.humanesociety.org/assets/pdfs/animal_fighting/dogfighting_statelaws.pdf.  
 58. Overcash, supra note 50, at 860-61.  
 59. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1589 (2010) (noting the variances among state 
hunting statutes, particularly those involving “canned hunting”); see also Brown v. Entm't Merchants 
Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011) (“States have long had laws against committing [animal cruelty].” 
(emphasis omitted)). 
 60. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1580-81.  The Court also warned of scenarios wherein no animal is 
actually treated cruelly, although the law might prohibit that behavior, such as intentionally but 
humanely killing an animal listed under the ESA.  Id. at 1588. 
 61. Bradford C. Mank, After Gonzales v. Raich: Is the Endangered Species Act Constitutional 
Under the Commerce Clause?, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 375, 431 (2007).  
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may be charged under the state animal cruelty law.62 
Federal wildlife conservation laws are authorized by several enumerated 
powers, including the Commerce Clause, the Treaty Power, and the Property 
Power.63  Among these laws are the Endangered Species Act,64 the Migratory Bird 
Treaty Act,65 the Bald Eagle Protection Act,66 the Lacey Act,67 and the Marine 
Mammal Protection Act.68  These powers have recognized limits, as the Supreme 
Court demonstrated in nullifying an application of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act to 
bring non-navigable waters under the Clean Water Act’s purview.69  Importantly, 
none of these laws expressly preempt a state’s authority to grant greater protections 
for wildlife animals on state or private lands.70 
C.  Animals in Research and Entertainment 
The treatment of animals in the course of research, education, and 
entertainment is regulated at both the state and federal levels.  The primary federal 
statute, the Animal Welfare Act (AWA),71 directs the USDA to set minimum 
standards for the “handling, care, treatment, and transportation of animals by 
dealers, research facilities, and exhibitors” in interstate commerce.72  Notably, these 
standards serve as baselines, and the AWA expressly recognizes state authority to 
augment its minimum standards and definitions,73 including its very limited 
definition of “animal.”74  Courts have interpreted this savings clause liberally, 
allowing states to prohibit or restrict activities that are permissible under AWA 
regulations.75   
                                                                                                     
 62. State v. Kuenzi, 796 N.W. 2d 222, 304-06 (Wisc. Ap. Ct. 2011) (holding defendants chargeable 
for criminal animal cruelty because using snowmobiles to ram and run over deer was not contemplated 
under applicable hunting and fishing statutes).  
 63. See Villareal, supra note 51, (collecting cases that explain the source of Congressional authority 
for wildlife management on federal lands).  
 64. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-44 (2010). 
 65. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-711 (2006). 
 66. 16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668d (2006). 
 67. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 3371-3378 (West 2010 & Supp. 2012). 
 68. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1361-1423h (West 2010 & Supp. 2012). 
 69. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 171 (2001) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 70. Federal law may preempt state wildlife management laws on federal lands, however.  See, Julie 
Lerman & Sanford P. Rabinowitz, Preemption of State Wildlife Law in Alaska: Where, When, & Why, 
24 ALASKA L. REV. 145, 150-51 (Dec. 2007). 
 71. 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2131-2159 (West 2010 & Supp. 2012). 
 72. Id. § 2143(a)(1). 
 73. Id. § 2143(a)(8) (allowing state and local governments to “promulgat[e] standards in addition to 
those standards promulgated by the Secretary”). 
 74. Id. § 2132(g) (omitting coverage for birds, rats, and mice used for research and all “farm 
animals”). 
 75. Dehart v. Town of Austin, Ind., 39 F.3d 718, 722 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[I]t is clear that the Animal 
Welfare Act does not evince an intent to preempt state or local regulation of animal or public welfare.”); 
Zimmerman v. Wolff, 622 F.Supp.2d 240, 247-48 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (finding the AWA did not preempt a 
state animal licensing scheme or animal cruelty law); American Canine. Found. v. Sun, No. C-06-4713 
MMC, 2007 WL 4208358, at *5 (N.D. Cal., Nov. 27, 2007) (dismissing claim that local licensing 
ordinance was preempted by the AWA).  
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D.  Agricultural Animals 
Without a doubt, the vast majority of animal suffering in the United States 
occurs in large-scale confinement facilities, and animal welfare law has failed to 
keep pace with industrial food production practices.76  This is particularly so at the 
federal level, despite the fact that most of our animal-based food is raised in 
federally-regulated facilities and sold interstate.  Other than the 1958 Humane 
Methods of Slaughter Act discussed herein, the only federal agricultural animal 
welfare law is the “Twenty-Eight Hour Law.”  This law, enacted in 1877, limits the 
length of time livestock may travel interstate without breaks for food, water, and 
rest.77  Until recently, the anachronistic limitations applied only to train travel; the 
USDA’s regulatory definition of “vehicle” did not include trucks traveling by 
highway until 2006.78  The handling of farmed animals during all other stages of 
life are entirely unaddressed by federal law.79   
Animal advocates have called for broad federal legislation to set minimum 
welfare standards for animals raised in “factories.”  As Congress and the USDA 
have been unwilling or unable to adopt meaningful welfare guidelines, the ethical 
case for treating agricultural animals more humanely has been taken up at the state 
level.80  A growing number of legislatures have instituted sunset provisions for the 
most inhumane industrial confinement practices, such as hog gestation crates, 
laying hen battery cages, and veal calf crates.81  More often than not, these policy 
shifts are instigated at the grass roots level, with ballot initiatives.  Californians 
approved Proposition 2, the 2008 Prevention of Farm Cruelty Act, by an 
                                                                                                     
76 Jonathan R. Lovvorn, California Proposition 2:  A Watershed Moment for Animal Law, 15 Animal 
L. 149, 162 (2009). 
 77. Livestock Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 59-340, 34 Stat. 607 (1906) (codified as amended at 
49 U.S.C. § 80502 (2006)). 
 78. 60 Fed. Reg. 48,362, 48,365 (Sept. 19, 1995) (“The Twenty-Eight Hour Law does not apply to 
transport by truck.”); 9 C.F.R. §§ 89.1-89.5 (2006) (implementing the Twenty-Eight Hour Law through 
USDA regulations). 
 79. Perry & Brandt, supra note 9, at 119 (finding it ironic that “the greatest protection afforded to 
[livestock] animals usually comes on the day of their slaughter”). 
 80. Overcash, supra note 50, at 860-61.  Some state animal cruelty statutes exempt farmed animals 
altogether.  Others limit the actus reus to practices outside the scope of traditional animal treatment, a 
variable standard that reflects what each state defines as “accepted agricultural practice,” as the Stevens 
Court noted. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct.  1577, 1589 (noting that in 2009 “California . . . 
banned cutting or ‘docking’ the tails of dairy cattle, which other States permit” (citing 2009 Cal. Legis. 
Serv. Ch. 344 (S.B. 135) and comparing Fla. Stat. § 828.23(5) (2007) (excluding poultry from humane 
slaughter requirements) with Cal. Food & Agric. Code Ann. § 19501(b) (including some poultry)).  See 
also Jeff Welty, supra note 29 (documenting state welfare laws applying to slaughter). 
 81. For example, nine states prohibit or are currently phasing out the use of gestation crates:  Rhode 
Island, R. I. St. § 4-1.1-3 (amended Ch. 12-S 2191A) (2012); Ohio, Oh. Admin. Code, § 901.12:8 
(2011); Michigan, M.C.L.A. § 287.746 (2009); Maine, 7 M.R.S.A. § 4020 (2009); California, Cal. 
Health & Safety Code, §§ 25990-25994 (2008); Colorado, C.R.S.A. § 35-50.5 (2008); Oregon, ORS § 
600.150 (2007); Arizona, A.R.S. § 13-2910.07 (2006); and Florida, Fla. Const. art. X, § 21 (2002).  As 
of this writing, New Jersey is likely to become the tenth state to ban gestation crates for hogs.  New 
Jersey Becomes Tenth State to Ban Sow Stalls, PIG SITE (Mar. 29, 2013), 
http://www.thepigsite.com/swinenews/32752/new-jersey-becomes-10th-state-to-ban-sow-stalls.   
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unprecedented margin.82  As the standard-bearers in all other areas of animal 
welfare law, states are best positioned to protect the basic needs of animals they 
raise for food.    
III.  THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND PREEMPTION LIMITS  
ON ANIMAL WELFARE STANDARDS  
Congress’s Article I, Section 8 authority “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations, and among the several States”83 remains the most debated and changeable 
of the enumerated powers.84  In fact, the clause has not always been used to test 
congressional authority; in the 1800s it was invoked to prevent states from enacting 
commerce-related legislation that discriminated against other states.85  The most 
notorious shift in Commerce Clause jurisprudence occurred in 1937, when the 
clause was interpreted to support broad New Deal legislation, beginning with the 
National Labor Relations Act.86  The doctrine reached its high watermark in the 
1960s, when it was used to affirm the constitutionality of federal Civil Rights 
laws.87   
Thirty years later, in United States v. Lopez,88 four Associate Justices joined 
Chief Justice Rehnquist to introduce a refashioned, narrower doctrine for 
evaluating congressional acts.  Since then, Commerce Clause challenges have 
yielded a number of thorny, contentious opinions.89  The Lopez rubric offers three 
ways in which Congress may exercise its authority.  First, it may regulate channels 
of interstate commerce.90  Second, it may regulate or protect instrumentalities or 
persons traveling in interstate commerce.91  The third option is to regulate 
                                                                                                     
 82. Jonathan R. Lovvorn, California Proposition 2:  A Watershed Moment for Animal Law, 15 
ANIMAL L. 149, 167-68 (2009); State of Cal., Proposition 2, CAL. GEN. ELECTION, 
http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/past/2008/general/title-sum/prop2-title-sum.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2013). 
 83. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. 
 84. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 15-16 (2005) (“[O]ur understanding of the reach of the 
Commerce Clause, as well as Congress' assertion of authority thereunder, has evolved over time.”); 
M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 405 (1819) (“[T]he question respecting the extent of the powers 
actually granted, is perpetually arising, and will probably continue to arise, so long as our system shall 
exist.”)  
 85. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 553-54; see also, e.g., Harvey v. Huffman, 39 F. 646, 647 
(D. Ind. 1889) (determining whether an Indiana livestock inspection act should be enforceable against 
the defendant); Swift v. Sutphin, 39 F. 630, 631 (N.D. Ill. 1889) (evaluating Minnesota pre-slaughter 
inspection regulations for their effect on out-of-state commerce participants). 
 86. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36-38 (1937).  
 87. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 
379 U.S. 294 (1964).  But see Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 (describing Wickard v. Filburn as “perhaps the 
most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity”). 
 88. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (1995) (striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act because it 
criminalized activities having “nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise”). 
 89. See, e.g., NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2609 (2012) (splitting 5-4 on the Commerce Clause question); 
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 718 (2006) (same); Raich, 545 U.S. at 4 (2005) (answering the 
Commerce Clause question by a majority of six Justices, with only five Justices agreeing on the 
reasoning); Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 
161 (2001) (resolving the Commerce Clause question 5-4). 
 90. Raich, 545 U.S. at 16; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558; Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 256. 
 91. Raich, 545 U.S. at 16-17; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.  Broad federal authority under the Endangered 
Species Act allows the government to prohibit “takings” of listed species and habitat, even if purely 
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economic activities that, individually or in the aggregate, “substantially affec[t] 
interstate commerce.”92   
None of these three categories, as interpreted by Lopez and its progeny, can be 
used to enact federal animal welfare standards that preempt, absolutely, state or 
local regulations that raise the federal standards.  The two potentially applicable 
categories are discussed below, beginning with federal authority to prevent 
“immoral or injurious abuses” of channels of interstate commerce, and then moving 
to the regulation of economic activities having a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce. 
A.  Maximum Livestock Slaughter and Handling Standards Cannot Protect 
Channels of Interstate Commerce from “Immoral or Injurious Abuses”    
The most straightforward application of the “channels of interstate commerce” 
category is the regulation of avenues of transportation between states, such as 
highways, rivers, or railways.93  A more nuanced application of this category 
authorizes regulations designed to prevent interstate commerce from being harmed 
or burdened by “immoral or injurious uses.”94   This regulatory authority may apply 
to activities of a “purely local character” so long as interstate commerce registers 
“the pinch” of that detrimental activity.95  An example of this authority is the 
Endangered Species Act’s prohibition on all incidences of “taking” or destroying 
the habitat of listed species.  This is a permissible use of Commerce Clause 
authority to “prevent injurious local practices that in turn have a substantial harmful 
effect on interstate commerce either by discouraging such commerce or by inciting 
a race to the bottom.”96   
For similar reasons, Congress enacted the precursor to the FMIA, the Meat 
Inspection Act of 1906.97  The Act answered President Roosevelt’s call to address 
widespread corruption and safety threats98 that were unchecked by weak federal 
influence on the intrastate and interstate meat trades.99  Indeed, multiple sections of 
the FMIA are valid expressions of this type of Commerce Clause authority.  The 
Statement of Purpose affirms Congress’s intent to protect the market from injuries 
caused by unfair and illegal competitive practices, such as offering “unwholesome, 
                                                                                                     
intrastate, because it is “necessary to enable the government to control the transport of the endangered 
species in interstate commerce.”  Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1046 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997) (cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2340 (1998)).  
 92. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000); see also Raich, 545 U.S. at 17 (allowing 
regulations of isolated local or intrastate activities so long as their aggregate effect on interstate 
commerce is substantial); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971).   
 93. 49 U.S.C. § 80502 (2006). 
 94. Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 256 (citing Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491 (1917) 
(“[T]he authority of Congress to keep the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and 
injurious uses has been frequently sustained, and is no longer open to question.”)). 
 95. Id. at 258. 
 96. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1048-49 (finding that the Endangered Species Act’s 
Section 9 taking provision constitutionally regulated channels of interstate commerce in two respects).   
 97. Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3913, 34 Stat. 669.   
 98. Nat’l Meat Ass’n v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 965, 968 (2012).  
 99. Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1225-26 
(1986).  
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adulterated, mislabeled, or deceptively packaged articles . . . at lower prices.”100  
The prohibition on misbranding or adulterating meat and meat products sold for 
human consumption is meant to stem injurious abuses to these markets.   
For instance, the federal laws upheld in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States 
and Katzenbach v. McClung were civil rights laws enacted to deter immoral 
behavior by business owners who might otherwise exploit or mistreat minority 
participants in interstate commerce.  Although one business owner’s racially-
motivated refusal of service to a black customer is a purely local event, if the 
would-be customer decides to opt out of the market rather than suffer this indignity, 
commerce is negatively impacted by this moral abuse.  Another illustration of this 
regulatory power is the federal minimum wage mandate analyzed in United States 
v. Darby.101  The established minimum hourly wage prevents “states with higher 
regulatory standards from being disadvantaged vis-à-vis states with lower 
regulatory standards” and limits states that might otherwise compromise the 
welfare of their citizens to attract new businesses.102   
Federal animal welfare standards that criminalize abusive acts and compel 
humane treatment likewise prevent “moral abuse” of interstate commerce.  Under 
Darby’s logic, federal minimum animal welfare standards for humane slaughter or 
for handling sick or disabled livestock are acceptable methods of protecting 
interstate commerce from moral abuses incurred by unregulated market 
participants.  As such, the HMSA’s requirement that livestock animals be stunned 
unconscious before being shackled and hoisted for slaughter, and its guidelines for 
handling non-ambulatory livestock, are supportable.   
The critical distinction between this example of valid authority and the 
preemption authority championed by NMA and asserted by the USDA in National 
Meat is that Darby’s moral abuse test applies to a federal minimum wage, not 
maximum wage.  A federal maximum wage standard, one that would limit state 
legislative authority to mandate higher state wage requirements, would no longer 
serve the purpose of protecting channels of commerce from injurious uses.  It 
would also be illogical.  Therefore, the Darby category of Commerce Clause 
authority cannot support using a federal maximum animal welfare standard to 
preempt more rigorous state standards.  
B.  Mandatory Upper Limits on HMSA Animal Welfare Standards  
Fail the “Substantial Effect on Interstate Commerce” Test 
The Commerce Clause empowers Congress to regulate individual activities of 
citizens, if these activities affect interstate commerce and the absence of such 
regulation would seriously compromise the enforcement of broad federal 
legislation.  Although this doctrine has sanctioned federal limits on individual 
                                                                                                     
 100. Act of  Mar. 4, 1907, ch. 2907, title I, § 2, in Pub. L. No. 90-201, § 2, 81 Stat. 587 (1967) 
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 602 (2006)). 
 101. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941).  Arguably, HMSA’s humane slaughter 
guidelines also protect the market from injurious or moral abuses in that the minimum standards create 
safer conditions for line workers.  See infra, section III(A)(2).   
 102. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1048 (applying Darby to the Endangered Species 
Act). 
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wheat production103 and permitted federal criminal charges on individuals 
possessing or growing medical marijuana plants,104 it cannot be used to sanction 
the de facto preemption power of HMSA guidelines over broader state animal 
cruelty laws.   
Under the “substantial effect” rubric, Congress needs only a rational belief that 
the conduct being regulated has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.105  To 
illustrate, the federal regulations challenged in Wickard v. Filburn and Gonzales v. 
Raich addressed activities that were already being performed by individuals.  
Farmers were growing wheat for their livestock, and consumers of legal and illegal 
marijuana were growing their own plants.  Left unregulated, these activities 
impacted interstate commercial markets.  Congress was aware of the cumulative 
effects of these activities, and it sought to temper the effects and encourage 
commercial transactions by regulating the individual acts.  Limiting a wheat 
farmer’s production forced that farmer to purchase additional wheat for his 
livestock.  Prohibiting a medical marijuana patient from using home-grown sources 
supported legal commercial transactions from licensed dispensaries and 
discouraged illegal production and consumption.   
For upper limits on animal welfare standards to be constitutional under the 
“substantial effect” test, Congress must be able to demonstrate a reasonable 
certainty that merely permitting states to expand animal welfare protections to 
farmed animals will negatively impact interstate commerce.  Preemptively 
prohibiting these state laws prevents any reasonable assessment from occurring.  
Because California’s § 599f was the first state law challenged for imposing welfare 
standards beyond HMSA guidelines, any substantial effects the animal welfare 
regulations may have had on commerce were speculative.106  Had National Meat 
challenged the constitutionality of de facto preemption of California’s humane 
handling guidelines, the federal government would have been required to 
demonstrate why Congress was reasonably certain the federal limits were necessary 
to curb their adverse effects on interstate commerce.   
As the Supreme Court meticulously explained in Raich, federal authority  over 
an individual activity may be permissible if the regulation is “an essential part” of a 
broad “regulatory scheme [that] could be undercut” if the activity went 
unregulated.107  The federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA)108 discussed in Raich 
was a “comprehensive regime to combat the international and interstate traffic in 
illicit drugs,”109 and the challenged section of the law banned the possession and 
                                                                                                     
 103. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942). 
 104. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (citing United States v. Perez, 402 U.S. 146, 151 (1971); 
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128-29). 
 105. Raich, 545 U.S. at 17-19 (“When Congress decides that the ‘total incidence’ of a practice poses 
a threat to a national market, it may regulate the entire class.” (quoting Perez, 402 U.S. at 154)). 
 106. The only exception is unrelated to this topic.  Jones v. Butz, 374 F. Supp. 1284, 1291, 1293 
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (upholding the HMSA’s ritual-slaughter exemption against an Establishment Clause 
challenge).  
 107. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (describing the Gun-Free School Zone Act as 
a “criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic 
enterprise”).  
 108. 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 801-971 (West 1999 & Supp. 2012). 
 109. Raich, 545 U.S. at 12.  
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production of medical marijuana.  The Court accepted the Government’s argument 
that not prohibiting intrastate possession and production would compromise the 
CSA’s effectiveness.110  Under the same rationale, federal limits on individual 
wheat production were upheld in Wickard.  The stability of the wheat market was 
critical to the success of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 (AAA).111  
Like the CSA and the AAA, the FMIA is a broad legislative scheme.  Nearly 
every section of the Meat Inspection Act concerns post-slaughter stages in meat 
production, including inspecting, processing, packaging, labeling, storing, 
transporting, marketing, and selling meat and meat products.112  The only sections 
concerning the treatment of live animals are related to Humane Slaughter Act 
regulations.  These regulations fall into two categories:  those related to slaughter, 
and those related to managing the animal at the slaughter and processing plant, 
prior to slaughter.   
1.  Only Minimum Humane Slaughter Standards are Essential  
to the Federal Meat Inspection Act’s Goals 
Taking these categories in turn, the humane slaughter guidelines require that 
cattle and hogs be rendered unconscious before being hoisted off the ground for 
slaughter.  This may prevent tremendous suffering by the animal, but it also has 
significant food safety and employee safety benefits.113  The HMSA’s declaration 
of policy observes that humane slaughter “results in safer and better working 
conditions” for slaughterhouse workers; “brings about improvement of products 
and economies in slaughtering operations; and produces other benefits for 
producers, processors, and consumers which tend to expedite an orderly flow of 
livestock and livestock products in interstate and foreign commerce.”114   
Thus, the federal minimum standards are essential to meeting the FMIA’s food 
safety goals.  If a state wishes to raise its standards for “humane” slaughter 
conditions, it is unlikely that more stringent guidelines would reverse the benefits 
achieved by the federal standards.  Instead, they may further protect line workers 
from injuries caused by inadequately-stunned animals.  Or, they may decrease the 
chances of pathogenic feces contamination.  Indeed, preventing states from raising 
these standards could be antithetical to FMIA’s food safety goals. 
                                                                                                     
 110. Id. at 30.  
 111. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 115 (1942) (allowing the government to limit individual 
wheat yields to “avoid surpluses and shortages and the consequent abnormally low or high wheat prices 
and obstructions to commerce”). 
 112. See Andrea M. Repphun, Pigs-in-a-Blanket:  How Current Meat Inspection Regulations Wrap 
America in False Security, 16 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 183, 192-94 (2011) (analyzing enforcement 
provisions of the HMSA). 
 113. This conclusion is supported by the Court’s opinion in United States v. Stevens, which observed 
that not all federal regulations dictating “the proper treatment of animals” are crafted out of concern for 
animal well-being.  United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1588 (2010) (“Livestock regulations are 
often designed to protect the health of human beings.”).   
 114. 7 U.S.C. § 1901 (2006). 
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2.  Maximum Limits on Standards for Managing Non-Ambulatory Livestock  
Are Not Reasonably Certain to Substantially Affect Interstate Commerce 
National Meat Ass’n dealt with the second category of HMSA regulations, 
those relating to the management of livestock prior to slaughter.  These regulations 
fall into two sub-categories:  food safety regulations and animal welfare 
regulations.   As explained in Section I, the requirement to sequester non-
ambulatory livestock and subject them to FSIS inspection is intended to prevent 
diseased animals from entering the human food supply.  This regulation is 
reasonably necessary to serve the FMIA’s food safety goals.  By contrast, the 
regulation defining allowable methods for transporting a non-ambulatory cow to 
the sequester pen is an animal welfare guideline, not a food safety guideline.   
California’s § 599f included both food safety and animal welfare regulations.  
Although the Supreme Court struck § 599f in its entirety, the subsections directly 
preventing the use of non-ambulatory livestock in the human food supply115 were 
severable from the subsections imposing more humane guidelines for handling and 
transporting non-ambulatory cows and pigs.  If, in defending § 599f, California had 
distinguished these two types of regulations, it might have preserved the animal 
welfare subsections from preemption.  By not severing the two types of regulations, 
California inadvertently bolstered the Court’s adoption of a novel theory about the 
FMIA.  Justice Kagan’s opinion described the FMIA as having “dual goals of food 
safety and animal welfare.”116  This characterization defies a plain reading of the 
FMIA’s text and the legislative histories of the FMIA and HMSA.   
The Humane Slaughter Act’s congressional record and regulatory history also 
contradict this attribution.  In the fifty years since its enactment, the HMSA’s 
vague statutory parameters for humane slaughter have remained unchanged.117  In 
the last decade, numerous bills mandating more humane treatment of downed 
livestock have failed to garner adequate political support.118  Congress has merely 
authorized, but has not required, the USDA to criminally or civilly enforce HMSA 
standards,119 leaving the FSIS with limited enforcement options.  Even when its 
                                                                                                     
 115. One might argue that subsections § 599f(a)-(b) and (f)-(g) indirectly serve animal welfare 
concerns by discouraging commercial trade in non-ambulatory livestock.  However, these provisions 
only prevent the carcasses from non-ambulatory livestock from entering the human food supply.  
Section 599f still allowed packing plants to trade in carcasses from non-ambulatory livestock for other 
purposes, such as rendering. 
 116. Nat’l Meat Ass’n v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 965, 968 (2012).   
 117. 7 U.S.C. § 1904(b) (2006).  Jeff Welty argues that in 1958, the overriding reasons for enacting 
the HMSA was to prevent animals from experiencing unnecessary pain and suffering at the time of 
slaughter.  On the other hand, the congressmen who revisited the act in 1978 to align HMSA standards 
with the Meat Inspection Act goals, were primarily focused on food safety standards and appeasing the 
livestock processors and packers.  Welty, supra note 29, at 186 n.68.  
 118. Downed Animal and Food Safety Protection Act, H.R. 3704, 112th Cong. (2011); Downed 
Animal and Food Safety Protection Act of 2010, S. 4007, H.R. 4356, 111th Cong.; Downed Animal 
Enforcement Act of 2008, S. 2770, 110th Cong.; Downed Animal and Food Safety Protection Act of 
2007, S. 394, 110th Cong.; Downed Animal and Food Safety Protection Act, H.R. 661, 110th Cong. 
(2007); Downed Animal Protection Act, S. 1779, H.R. 3931, 109th Cong. (2005); Downed Animal 
Protection Act, S. 1298, H.R. 2519, 108th Cong. (2003); Downed Animal Protection Act, S. 267, H.R. 
1421, 107th Cong. (2001).   
 119. See Perry & Brandt, supra note 9, at 120-21 (claiming that prior to the introduction of S. 2770 
the USDA’s enforcement of its humane slaughter guidelines was merely an “appearance of enforcement 
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investigators identify cases of egregious abuse, the FSIS may only cite the plant 
and require it to submit “a plan for corrective action,” or temporarily close the plant 
for investigation.120   
The USDA’s meager rulemaking and enforcement records also contradict 
National Meat’s notion of the FMIA as an animal welfare law.  Although 
inadequate enforcement has been cited as a primary concern, and surveyed USDA 
FSIS inspectors cite sparse regulatory guidelines and a lack of agency guidance as 
their primary enforcement challenges, Congress has never separately funded 
livestock management and slaughter inspections121 and the USDA has been slow to 
promulgate new rules and enforcing existing standards.122  This gap in federal 
oversight underscores the importance of state law, whether it is an animal cruelty 
law that applies to non-traditional agricultural practices, or it is a law specifically 
drafted to protect farmed animals.  Barring state governments from legislating in 
this area means animal abusers will never be criminally accountable for acts like 
those depicted in the Hallmark/Westland video.123   
C.  The Welfare of Animals in Agriculture is a State Interest 
As explained, most animal welfare legislation originates at the state level, as a 
function of state police authority.  Importantly, this legislative authority does not 
require endowment by the U.S. Constitution.124  Where Congress lacks enumerated 
authority to legislate, a state is free to act, so long as the legislation does not offend 
constitutionally-protected rights125 and it is founded on a rational basis.126  As a 
                                                                                                     
rather than any meaningful consequence”); 7 U.S.C. § 1907 (2006); Farm Security & Rural Investment 
Act of 2002, 116 Stat. 134 § 10815.   
 120. Perry & Brandt, supra note 9, at 120. 
 121. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-487T, HUMANE METHODS OF SLAUGHTER ACT: 
WEAKNESSES IN USDA ENFORCEMENT 1-5 (2010), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/130/124119.pdf (recalling the as-yet unfulfilled FSIS commitment to 
“establish additional clear, specific, and consistent criteria” for enforcement).  
 122. Id. at 6-7 (citing the FSIS Strategic Plan FY 2008 through FY 2013 as illustrative of the 
agency’s failure to “clearly articulate or list goals related to HMSA enforcement”); U.S. GOV'T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-247, HUMANE METHODS OF SLAUGHTER ACT: USDA HAS 
ADDRESSED SOME PROBLEMS BUT STILL FACES ENFORCEMENT CHALLENGES 6 (2004), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04247.pdf (offering recommendations to improve enforcement).  As 
Jeff Welty observed, whereas the Code of Federal Regulations contains around six pages of HMSA 
rules, “the overall number of pages devoted to the meat and poultry inspection program approaches 350.  
Seventeen pages are devoted to post-mortem meat inspection alone.”  Welty, supra note 29, at 188. 
 123. Id. at 121-22 (“[T]he USDA's complete lack of authority to target individual offenders for their 
cruel acts can and should be supplemented by state law prosecutions.  To facilitate this, most states will 
need legislation extending cruelty laws to farm animals; California's laws allowing for prosecution of 
the Hallmark employees are the exception rather than the rule.”). 
 124. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618-19 (2000). 
 125. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2578;  see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., v. City of Hialeah, 
508 U.S. 520, 533-40 (1993) (overturning a local ordinance because it impermissibly targeted a 
religious practice protected by the First Amendment); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 565-79 (2003) 
(invaliding on federal constitutional grounds a Texas criminal statute condemning homosexual conduct).  
If violence towards animals is not violence “directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods 
involved in interstate commerce,” then its regulation “has always been the province of the States.”  
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618. 
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result, federally-mandated limits on state livestock welfare laws infringe on the 
“liberties that [citizens] derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.”127 
In 2007, the Seventh Circuit affirmed this state authority when it upheld an 
Illinois ban on the slaughter of horses for human consumption because “[s]tates 
have a legitimate interest in prolonging the lives of animals that their population 
happens to like.”128  The plaintiff in that case, an equine slaughterhouse, argued 
that the ban was preempted by the FMIA.129  Writing for the court, Judge Richard 
Posner submitted that Congress’s authority to regulate horse slaughter under the 
Meat Inspection Act does not require states to permit the slaughter of horses.130 
Extrapolating on this notion, Congress’s authority to regulate all aspects of 
selling meat and meat products in interstate and intrastate commerce should not 
inevitably preclude states from adopting regulations protecting animals used in the 
production of this food.  The desire for animals to be treated humanely in the 
production of food is an issue “touch[ing] on citizens’ daily lives” that is best 
“administered by smaller governments closer to the governed.”131  National Meat 
stood for the proposition that Congress could require Californians to accept, 
participate in, contribute to, and endorse what they consider inhumane and 
unethical activities. 
CONCLUSION 
The first episode of Portlandia, a satirical comedy sketch television show, 
features two socially-conscious meat-eaters who are reluctant to order the chicken 
entrée until they can be convinced that the chicken had led a happy life.  Without 
batting an eye, their waitress produces the heritage chicken’s photograph and 
                                                                                                     
 126  Although scholars differ, the Supreme Court has not ruled definitively that federal or state 
governments have a compelling interest in ensuring the humane treatment of animals.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1600, n.6 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting) (insisting that the government 
may have a compelling interest and pointing to precedent that “evidence of a national consensus” can 
stand as “proof that a particular government interest is compelling” (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. 
Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 
468 U.S. 609, 624-25 (1984))); Brief for a Group of American Law Professors as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Neither Party at 9-10, Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2009) (No. 08-769); Meredith L. Shafer, 
Note, Perplexing Precedent: United States v. Stevens Confounds A Century of Supreme Court 
Conventionalism and Redefines the Limits of "Entertainment," 19 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 281, 322 
(2012) (reading from Church of the Lukumi the Court’s “implied . . . acceptance of a compelling 
governmental interest in preventing the suffering or mistreatment of animals”)).  In fact, the Stevens 
Court actively avoided this question when it affirmed the Third Circuit under a different analysis.  
Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1592 (striking down the crush video law because it was impermissibly overbroad); 
United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218, 232-35 (3d Cir. 2008) (deciding that the federal government has 
no compelling interest in protecting animals from extreme cruelty).  The Justices do not agree as to the 
analysis applied in Stevens.  Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2747 (2011) (Alito, J., 
concurring in the judgment but disputing the claim that the federal law in Stevens was subjected to strict 
scrutiny analysis).  It bears mentioning that Stevens mentions “strict scrutiny” only once, in discussing 
the Third Circuit’s analysis.  Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1584. 
 127. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2578 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992)).  
 128. Cavel Int’l, Inc. v. Madigan, 500 F.3d 551, 557 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 129. Id. at 553. 
 130. Id. at 554 (“The government taxes income from gambling that violates state law; that doesn’t 
mean the state must permit the gambling to continue.”). 
 131. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2578. 
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“papers,” announcing: “Here is the chicken you will be enjoying tonight. . . .  His 
name was Colin.”132  The spirit of this satire rings increasingly authentic among 
American consumers fortunate enough to be selective about their food.  Although 
Californians have led this trend, the swelling political will has garnered the 
attentions of a growing list of state legislatures.133   
National Meat is a significant barrier to this movement.  In a recent critique of 
National Meat, Professor David Cassuto warned of the “powerful legal 
implications” of conflating the terms “animal” and “meat” in food and agricultural 
law.134  By merging concepts of “food safety” with “animal welfare,” the Court laid 
the foundation for Congress to reserve exclusive legislative authority over an entire 
branch of animal welfare law.  Taking the opinion to its logical conclusion, 
Congress and the USDA theoretically possess almost limitless power to preempt 
competing state farmed animal welfare legislation.   
Although Congress has historically refrained from addressing the conditions of 
animals in industrial agriculture, the mounting conflict between meat and poultry 
corporations and the organizations representing animal welfare, food safety, and 
consumer protection concerns will eventually force congressional action.  Unless 
Congress’s preemption power over state animal welfare law is challenged, the 
federal government will retain an unchecked authority to suppress legislative 
expressions of our moral and ethical values, by defining and enforcing artificial 
limits to our humanity.   
                                                                                                     
 132. Portlandia: Farm (IFC broadcast Jan. 21, 2011) available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l2LBICPEK6w. 
 133. See, e.g., THE HUMANE SOC’Y OF THE U.S., STATES GESTATION CRATE LAWS (last updated Jan. 
2, 2013), available at http://www.humanesociety.org/assets/pdfs/legislation/gestation_crate_laws.pdf 
(listing Florida, Arizona, Oregon, Colorado, California, Maine, Michigan, Ohio, and Rhode Island as 
states to have banned the use of gestation crates); supra note 81(documenting state legislatures that have 
eliminated some inhumane industrial confinement practices). 
 134. Cassuto, supra note 6, at 1-2 (warning of the “powerful legal implications” of conflating 
“animals” with “meat”).   
